As my portfolio increased in volume, I established an online presence
with the creation of my own website (the now defunct www.brewis.it) and via the
use of relevant online forums. Having worked as a marketing manager in the
travel industry, I was aware of the importance of promotion - although I found
self-promotion to be a more uncomfortable experience.
With this in mind, I also aimed to raise my profile by attending industry
meetings or events. For example, I was a regular attendee at
Autodesk’s bi-annual meetings in both Birmingham and Manchester. I also
joined a Warwickshire based collective of “Serious Game” makers. This was
a grouping of academics, artists, programmers and developers aiming to utilise
gaming technology in wider scenarios. These included: medicine, the armed
forces and education. Their approach was functional and
multi-disciplinary in nature. I was particularly taken with the concepts
of edutainment and the blurring of traditional boundaries (Lister et al, 2009).
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| Baby, 2005 |
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| Medusa (Auriga concept), 2005 |
As a result of these industry contacts, I came to realise that my own
work lacked direction; working as a freelancer I had become something of a
‘generalist’. This had previously been an advantage when seeking
different clients and had helped establish a limited reputation. However,
increasingly I felt that my earlier proliferation mean that I was potentially overlooked
for contracts in deference to specialist artists.
In addition, I increasingly accepted short-term teaching roles to to
supplement my freelance income. This was work I enjoyed, was well paid, and
provided a level of security missing for freelance work. The courses I taught included those for beginners,
post-graduates and industry professionals.
These were held at a variety of venues – including universities, further
education colleges and studios. As a
result I was able to meet a wide range of practitioners and students.
However, as with my actual 3D graphics, I found that I was becoming
a less specialised professional. Therefore,
taking stock, in 2005 I made the decision to focus my energies on a
single product of my own. Recruiting and leading a small group of
animators, designers and programmers; I set about designing a multiplayer game
for play via a web-browser. This was provisionally titled Auriga and
was intended to recreate Roman (mythological) chariot racing in an edutainment
format.
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| Environment models, 2005 |
At best, this was a naïve venture. It is clear that I lacked the
experience, technical knowledge and finance to make Auriga a
success. Heedless, I managed the project from its conception, overseeing:
game documentation, modelling, animation, texture work, programming and
even music. Understandably this involved a vast amount of commitment and
finance – both of which I seriously underestimated.
At first the project progressed agreeably, demonstration designs were well received
and I was offered limited outside investment. In time, however, the
project floundered due to a lack of planning, over optimism (re arrogance) and
finance.
For example, designing for the web placed severe restrictions on creative
output. It ensured that polygon counts must be low and that texture
maps/lighting be kept to a minimum. This proved difficult and several
problems ensued that required work to be rebuilt. Several
design compromises had to be made and I was never satisfied with the
final quality of work.
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| Circus (low polygon, untextured draft), 2006 |
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| Circus (texture draft), 2006 |
Programming the game was also a problematic area. I had only a
rudimentary knowledge of Lingo and had to rely upon two Java programmers.
Their work was erratic and consequently I began to take more control – costing
valuable production time as I struggled with the concepts involved.
Equally damaging to the project was the choice of Adobe Director and the
Shockwave Player as a delivery method. I judged that Director’s 3D
capabilities at the time far exceeded alternative online solutions, including
Adobe’s own Flash Player. However, the expected boom in online 3D
content did not materialise. It later transpired that support and use of
both Director and of Shockwave were both already in decline (Aymer, 2006).
These problems (and many more) forced the deadline for completion to be
extended several times and in late 2006 the project was shelved entirely.
The financial costs alone were considerable and I ultimately simply ran out of
money.
The experience of making Auriga highlighted
several of my weaknesses. Firstly, the project was simply too ambitious.
Given its scope, I also planned badly and without consultation with
adequate industry experts. I was also too ready to accept the virtues of
a potential new technology, even before these had been proven. In
addition, I was controlling and unable to trust others. Finally,
deadlines and financial restrictions were not adhered to, typically as a result
of an unrealistic perfectionism.